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Abstract: 
Community based health insurance schemes are becoming increasingly recognized as an 
instrument which help farmers in rural areas of low income countries to better manage health. 
Health risks present a permanent threat to the income earning capacity of poor people. Beside 
direct economic cost for treatment and lost working time, indirect cost such as a reduction in 
labor supply materialize which increases the vulnerability of the household. It is often 
hypothezised that community based health insurance improve social protection, but quantitative 
analysis is largely missing. Against this background,  this paper analyzes if members in a mutual 
health insurance scheme have a better access to health care than non-members taking “les 
mutuelles de santés” (mutual health organization) in rural Senegal as an example. Limited 
dependent and log linear regressions are used to capture the impact of health insurance on the 
probability of visiting a health care provider and the out-of-pocket expenditure at the point of use 
. The results of the analysis show that while community based health insurance schemes reach 
otherwise excluded people, the poorest of the poor in the communities are not covered. 
Regarding the impact on the access to health care, members have a higher probability of using 
hospitalization services compared to non-members and pay substantially less when they need 
care. Given the results from this study, community financing schemes have the potential to 
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1 Introduction 
Although it is widely agreed that poverty alleviation has a positive effect on health, the 
knowledge that better health care provision can be an important contribution to economic 
development and social protection is only slowly becoming accepted. Recent studies on the 
economic costs of illness stress the detrimental effect of health shocks on rural households as 
beside of financial and time cost, indirect costs of illness such as a reduction in labour supply 
materialise (Asfaw et al. 2001). In order to reduce the cost of illness for households, the 
introduction of community based health insurance is being discussed (WHO 2000, Jütting 2000, 
Creese and Bennett 1997). Partly as a response to the lack of public social protection, to the 
negative side-effects of user fees and to persistent problems with health care financing and 
quality, non-profit, voluntary insurance schemes for urban and rural self-employed and informal 
sector workers have recently emerged. These schemes are characterised by the pooling of health 
risks, and frequently, though not always, by an ethic of mutual aid and solidarity (Atim 1998, 
Ziemek and Jütting 2000). 
Existing studies on mutual insurance schemes in agricultural economics have largely focused on 
a) crop and yield insurance (e.g. Hazell 1992 and Verhul and Mersh) or b) at the question, 
weather or not mutual insurance schemes can smooth income and/or consumption of rural 
households (e.g. Morduch 1995). In this discussion, however, mutual health insurance schemes 
have been largely ignored. Against this background, this paper analyzes if mutual health 
insurance schemes improve the access to health care of the rural poor. We tackle two central 
questions: What are important socio-economic determinants explaining membership in a 
voluntary health insurance scheme? This allows us to identify important factors influencing the 
demand for health insurance. We are specifically interested in analyzing whether or not every 
segment of the society is equally represented in the mutuals or if adverse selection undermines 
the stability of the scheme. Second, what is the impact of the schemes on the utilization of health 
care and social protection comparing members and non-members?  
To answer these question we use a binary probit model for estimating marginal coefficients for 
the determinants of participation and a logit/log-linear model to analyze the impact on health 
care utilization and financial protection between members and non-members. With this 
methodology applied we go beyond most of the available studies on the impact of community 
financing schemes so far, which have either relied on secondary literature (e.g. Bennett et al. 
1998) or restricted their data analysis to qualitative interpretations (e.g. Atim 1998).  
We have chosen the case of Senegal which is specifically interesting, as we find here (Tine 
2000): 
•  a relatively long, 10-year experience with mutual health insurance schemes. 
•  an innovative institutional setting. There exists a contract between a non-profit health care 
provider, a catholic-run hospital, and the mutuals, which allows them to receive health care at 
a lower rate.  
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 gives a quick overview on health insurance 
schemes in rural Sub-Sahara Africa and presents the specific situation in Senegal. Following 
that, section 3 describes the research design and the methodology used. The results of the 
estimations are discussed in section  4. Section 5 concluded the paper.   3
2  Health insurance in rural Sub-Sahara-Africa 
Wiesmann and Jütting (2001) present in detail an overview of health insurance schemes outside 
formal sector employment in Sub-Saharan Africa, which is based on extensive research which 
has been done in the past few years (Bennett et al. 1998, Atim 1998, Musau 1999). The majority 
of the schemes have been set up in the nineties. The reasons which promote and foster the 
development of mutual health insurance schemes have not been analyzed in depth so far, but 
some tendencies are quite obvious (Wiesmann and Jütting 2001): First, people have been forced 
to think about alternative solutions as health care at the public facilities is no longer offered for 
free and the introduction of user fees has had negative effects especially for the poor. Second, in 
the context of decentralization more power has been delegated to the communities which allow 
them to take over more responsibilities also in the provision of local public goods. Third, the 
quite positive experience with credit and financing institutions is leading to the discussion if the 
mutuals should enlarge their portfolio to include also insurance products. Finally, the cost of 
illness debate in the literature has shown that health shocks often force households to high cost 
risk coping strategies. Access to insurance could reduce these costs substantially (Weinberger 
and Jütting 2000, Asfaw et al. 2001).  
The map in Figure 1 gives a view of health insurance schemes outside the formal employment 
sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. The map clearly shows that so far, community based health 
insurance is more common in West Africa than in Central or  East Africa. In some countries, 
these new schemes are mainly an urban phenomenon – such as in Côte d‘Ivoire  and in Tanzania 
– whereas in other states, they are predominantly covering people in rural areas; examples are 
Uganda, Ghana and Benin.    4 
Figure 1: Urban and rural health insurance schemes in Sub-Saharan Africa – year of inception and size 
Source: Wiesmann and Jütting (2001)   5
Some of the schemes are confined to a local cooperative of craftsmen or traders, therefore 
they are often very small and may cover less than 100 beneficiaries (Kiwara 1997). Other 
insurance schemes are extended over the whole country and many communities and include 
up to 1 million or even more beneficiaries (Bennett et al. 1998). The number of beneficiaries 
can change rapidly and neither reveals the financial balance of the schemes, nor does it say 
much about the scheme’s sustainability. Indeed, a few schemes had to be terminated after 
some years (Criel 1998, Bennett et al. 1998), whilst others have been in operation for decades.  
In Senegal there has been a relative long tradition with mutual health insurance. The first 
experience started in the village of Fandène in the Thiès region in 1990. From the beginning, 
the movement in Senegal has been supported by a local health care provider, the non-profit 
hospital St. Jean de Dieu. Today there are 16 mutual health insurance schemes operating in 
the area of Thiès. The main features of the schemes are: 
•  the schemes are community based 
•  90 % of the schemes operate in rural areas 
•  with the exception of one mutual – Ngaye Ngaye - they only cover hospitalization 
•  the mutuals have a contract with the hospital St. Jean de Dieu, where they get a reduction 
of up to 50 % for treatment 
•  in general the household is a member of a mutual, who participates in the decisions. He 
has a membership card on which he can put all or selected members of his family 
(beneficiaries). The membership fee is per person insured. 
Table 1 presents the details of the different payment forms at the hospital.  
Table 1:   Hospitalization fees for members and non-members at St. Jean de Dieu 
      Hospital 
   Hospitalization 
  Ticket for 
consultation 
Daily cost  Operation (surgery) 
Members 
Payment by : 
3 000 F CFA 
member 
3 750 F CFA 
mutual 




6 000 F CFA 
non-member 
7 500 F CFA 
non-member 
1 500 F CFA/unit 
non-member 
  Source: ZEF-ISED survey, 2000 
It shows that a member has to pay a minimum amount of 3.000 F CFA for a treatment. If he 
needs surgery he has to pay himself 50 % of the total costs for the operation. The daily cost of 
hospitalization, including also laboratory analysis, consultation and to some extend 
radiography, is paid by the mutual which benefits of a reduction of 50 %. A mutual pays  
3750 F CFA/day for each hospitalization of its members, compared with 7500 F CFA/day a 
non-member has to pay. In case of hospitalization, the member has to bring with him a letter   6
of guarantee which is given to him by the manager of the mutual if the member has paid the 
insurance premium regularly. A stay at the hospital between 10 and 15 days is integrally paid 
by the mutual. If the hospitalization exceeds this limit, the mutual pays the hospital for the 
entire invoice, because it guaranteed to do so. Afterwards the member reimburses the mutual 
step by step. To receive the described benefits the members of a mutual have to pay a monthly 
premium between 100 and 200 F CFA and the head of the household has to buy once a 
membership card for 1.000 F CFA.  
 
3  Research design and methodology 
3.1 Research design 
A household survey was carried out by the Institute for Health and Development (ISED) in 
Dakar in cooperation with the Center for Development Research in Bonn. It started with a 
pre-test in March 2000 and the final survey took place in May 2000. The participation rate in 
the interviews was with more than 95% very high. 
For the survey, we chose a two stage sampling procedure: First, we selected 4 villages out of 
the 16 villages in which mutuals operate. In each of the selected villages Fandène, Sanghé, 
Ngaye Ngaye and Mont Rolland only one mutual is in place, which has the same name as the 
village itself.  
The following table summarizes the major differences between the analyzed schemes: 











Fandène  10 years  6 km  90,3 %  Hospitalization 
Sanghé  3 years  8 km  37,4 %  Hospitalization 
Ngaye Ngaye  6 years  30 km  81,5 %  Primary  health 
care 
Mont Rolland  4 years  15 km  62,6 %  Hospitalization 
Source: ZEF-ISED survey, 2000 
In a second step, we selected randomly the households for the interviews. In all four villages, 
members and non-members were interviewed. In order to get a random sample out of the four 
villages, we used household lists of all inhabitants (members and non-members) of the four 
villages in order to calculate the percentage distribution between members and non-members 
and their respective weight in the sample. We interviewed a total of 346 households, 70% of 
which are members and 30 % of which are non-members. The data set contains information 
of roughly  2.900 persons, from which are 60 % members and 40 % non-members. This 
means that some household heads have not insured their complete family.   7
The data was entered immediately after completing the survey using SPSS Windows. In 
addition to the household survey, we interviewed key persons (leaders of the mutuals) in 
order to get complementary information about the functioning, problems and success of the 
mutuals. 
3.2 Methodology 
In order to estimate the determinants of participation in a mutual health organization, we 
follow an approach used by Weinberger and Jütting (2001) for determinants of participation 
in local organizations. In that approach participation in a local organization is depended on 
the rational choice of an individual weighting costs and benefits of membership. Cost and 
benefits are dependent on the existence, quality and access to assets. Hence it is assumed that 
participation (p) in a mutual depend on the current income of the household (y), 
characteristics of the household head (Zi), who decides if the household joins or not, 
household characteristics (Zh) and on community characteristics (Zc).  
The following equation describes our model: 
 
(1)   p = f (Zc, Zh, Zi, y)      
In our to estimate the probability of participation we use a binary probit model: 
 
(2)  Binary probit model:  
 
  p* = ß1y + ß2Zc + ß3 Zh +ß4 Zi+ uv 
 
p =  1 if p* > 0, i.e. the household has membership in a health insurance scheme 
0, if not 
In order to measure the effect of health insurance on access to health care services, a model 
approach is used, which is applied in the USA to measure the demand for health care services 
( e.g. Manning et al. 1987)
2. With this approach the determinants of demand for health care 
services are recorded in a first step using a logit model and, in a second step, a log linear 
regression model of the costs in the case of illness is estimated. Formally this approach can be 
written as follows:  
-  Logit model for the demand for health care services for the full sample: 
Probability (visit >0) = Xß +u    
-  Log linear model for estimating direct payments for those people with at least one visit: 
Log (direct payment/consultation > 0) = Xφ + e    
with X as a vector for a set of independent variables influencing individual pattern of 
utilization, including membership in a mutual. ß and φ are vectors of coefficient estimates 
of the respective models. u and e are error terms.   
                                                 
2 For a recent application see Yip and Berman (2001).   8
The independent variables determining the demand for health care and expenditure in the case 
of illness are – among others – age, gender, education, health status, income and, membership 
in a health insurance scheme. 
4 Results 
4.1 Determinants of membership in a health insurance scheme 
As outline above the decision of a household to participate in a mutual health organization is 
supposed to be influenced by individual, household and community characteristics. The 
variables representing individual characteristics of the household head involves age, 
education and sex and membership in another organization. With respect to age we 
hypothesize that younger household heads are more open for innovations (age group 1: 
positive coefficient) and that with increasing age people tend to participate less (age group 3: 
negative coefficient). Furthermore we expect that better educated people and male headed 
households tend to join a mutual more often than people with less education and female 
headed households.  
 
The following characteristics of the household is supposed to influence membership in a 
mutual: income; ethnic group, religion and the illness ratio. The most important variable to be 
looked at in the context of our research question is income and it’s effect on the decision to 
participate or not. In our study we have measured “income” as calculated by expenditure of 
the household per year and member. We assume that income has a positive influence on the 
decision to participate and that the poorer strata of the population will not participate due to 
difficulties in paying the premium. Also, it will be of interest to analyze whether the richer 
part of the population participates as this is important for risk pooling reasons. Hence, we 
include into the regression analysis income terzils, i.e. we divided our sample in three 
subgroups “rich”, “average” and “poor”. Added to the quantitative measures of wealth was 
relative wealth. Households were asked to classify themselves according to relative wealth 
within the community on a rank from one (poorer than the average) to three (wealthier than 
the average). We expect the same findings in tendency for the relative measures than for the 
quantitative measures. We have included a dummy variable “Wolof” in order to measure the 
influence of belonging to a specific ethnic. The Wolof are know for their openness for 
institutional innovations in the Senegalese context (Diallo 2000). The variable “religion” is 
included in order to take into account that the mutuals have an exclusive contract with the 
catholic owned hospital St. Jean de Dieu. Moreover, the mutuals get active support by the 
diocese de Thiès. Hence, we expect that Christians tend to enroll proportionally more than 
Muslims. We assume also a positive relationship between membership in a mutual and 
membership in other organizations. People who have already experience in participation in 
local organizations are most likely more willing to join a mutual insurance than people who 
have no experience in participation at all. To control for adverse selection we integrate the 
illness ratio of the household as a proxy for the health status. The variable describes the 
number of cases of illness of household members in relation to the overall household size. It 
is assumed that less healthier households tend to join mutuals more than healthier ones, 
leading to adverse selection problems.  
Finally, we include dummy variables capturing village characteristics: acknowledgement of 
solidarity in the village (solidarity) and village factors. We assume that people acknowledging 
a high value of solidarity in their village tend to participate more. With respect to the village 
effects, we want to control if the type of insurance matters, i.e. hospitalization care versus 
primary health care (Ngaye Ngaye) as well as for the specific local setting, i.e. the cultural 
environment in the specific village and specific characteristics of the mutual, i.e. distance to 
the hospital, the functioning of the mutual etc.   9
The results presented in table 3 show the marginal effects of the probit analysis. Three 
different models were evaluated, differing in their definition of the income variable. In the 
first model income is defined as a metric variable so as to analyze whether income has an 
influence on membership in a mutual. In the second model income groups are established, in 
order to determine effects between different income groups. In the third model income groups 
were also formed, but in contrast to model 2 they were not determined based on expenditure, 
but on the basis of self-assessment by the people surveyed
3. 
Table 3 shows that all three methods used are highly significant. Income has the anticipated 
positive influence on membership. Models 2 and 3 show furthermore that the lower income 
groups in the villages are significantly less represented in the mutuals. That means that the 
wealthy people in the communities are more likely to (be able to) participate in the insurance 
schemes. At the household level, religion and ethnic identity play an important role in 
addition to income. The clearly higher participation by Christians – the probability increases 
by about nearly 40 %-age points compared to non-Christians – was to be expected because of 
the intensive promotion of the mutuals by the Catholic church.  
While household characteristics do have an influence on the decision as to membership, this 
is obviously not the case for the individual characteristics of the head of the household, such 
as education, gender and age. All three characteristics are not significant. Membership in 
other organizations is a positive factor however. People who have already experienced the 
advantages and disadvantages of being associated to local groups are obviously more 
disposed towards membership in a health insurance scheme. 
The village effects that were discovered are also interesting. Different model variations show, 
for example, that the inhabitants of the villages Sanghé and Mont Rolland have a significantly 
lower probability of membership than people coming from the village Ngaye Ngaye and 
Fandène. These results indicate, that obviously the different type of health insurance provided 
– primary health care in Ngaye Ngaye and in patient care in the other three mutuals - had no 
significant influence on the decision to participate. Instead specific village factors, i.e. the 
management of the mutual seem to play a role. The mutual of Sanghé has faced several 
financing and managerial difficulties which have lead to a stop of operation for some time. As 
a consequence several people left the mutual. Efforts to reestablish the mutual have been 
successful and today the mutual is functioning again, however with a lower participation rate 
than before.  
                                                 
3 Estimating the income of households in developing countries is difficult. Since many of the people surveyed 
are reluctant to reveal their real income, income is generally measured by using expenditure. This method of 
measuring can be supplemented by asking the protagonists to do a self-assessment, comparing themselves with 
other households in the neighbourhood.   10
Table 3: Marginal coefficients for determinants of participation in mutual health 
insurance (household level) Dependent variable: Membership in a mutual (1 if the 
household is member and 0 otherwise) 







Individual charact. of household head     






Age group 1 (age 21-40) 
 













Literacy ( can read/ read and write,           















Household characteristics     
Wolof (household belonging to ethnic 


















Income terzile: Lower  
 






Self-wealth (self-classification of 
household): Poor 
Self-wealth: Rich 




Illness-ratio (number of cases of illness 








Community characteristics     
Fandène (household belonging to Fandène 







Sanghé (household belonging to Sanghé 







Mont Rolland (household belonging to 















Number of observations  338  338  341 
Pseudo  R²  0,567 0,569 0,568 
Chi²  120,32 121,39 127,96 
Prob > Chi²  0,000  0,000  0,000 
Frequencies of actual / predicted 
outcomes 
80 %  80 %  80 % 
* Significant at 0,1 level  ** Significant at 0,05 level  ***Significant at 0,01 level 
Source: own estimation based on ZEF-ISED survey data 
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4.2  Impact of membership on access to modern health care services  
In this section we test the hypothesis that members of a mutual have a better access to modern 
health care facilities than non-members. As outlined before we measure access in two 
respects: the probability of frequentation of a health care facility, i.e. to visit a hospital and the 
out-of-pocket expenditure at the point of use. Our primary variable of interest is membership 
in a mutual. We hypothesize that the probability of members to frequent a hospital is higher, 
while at the same time they pay less for their treatment in comparison to non-members after 
controlling for individual, household and community characteristics. This would mean that 
membership has a positive coefficient for the demand for health care and a negative one for 
the effect on expenditure. Beside membership, the other variable of key interest is income as 
we want to see how much demand health care utilization and out of pocket expenditure is due 
to the income level and the ability to pay.  
As control variables we include age, sex, education and the frequency of illness, which 
capture the need for health care and the health status of an individual. Village effects are taken 
into account for differences in the cost of seeking health care as well as the specific design of 
the mutuals. One assumption is that inhabitants from the village in Fandène have a better 
access to health care due to their relatively close distance to the hospital as well as to the 
reported well functioning of the mutual. The results of the estimates for the determinants of 
demand for health care services and the costs in the case of illness are presented in table 4.  
Both models are highly significant. 151 of the 2,856 people have been in hospital within the 
last two years
4. The findings of the estimates for both models suggest that the members of a 
mutual have better access to health care services than non-members. The probability of 
making use of hospitalization increases by 2 %-age points with membership and expenditure 
in case of need is reduced by about 50% compared with non-members. Regarding the 
individual characteristics and besides membership, age and gender play a role. Moreover, the 
results suggest that younger people make less use of the hospital than the elderly and they pay 
less on average if they do get ill. Furthermore, women use the hospital more than men. 
Women go to hospital especially when they have problems during pregnancy or birth.  
As far as the variables at the household level are concerned, it turns out that income has an 
impact on the demand for health care services and expenditure. The relatively better-off 
people in a community make more use of services and spend more money in the case of 
hospitalization. This is in line with findings on the demand for health care in other developing 
countries (Gertler and van der Gaag 1990).  
With respect to village effects, it seems that people living in Fandène have a higher effective 
demand for hospitalization than the people in the other three communities
5. A possible 
explanation is the fact that Fandène is the oldest mutual, which is according to our interview 
partners well organized and well functioning. In addition it is also the closest mutual to the 
hospital St. Jean de Dieu.  
 
                                                 
4 A certain percentage of the hospitalized persons had to be excluded from the “expenditure” analysis as they 
were not aware of the costs which they had to pay because other family members paid for them.  
5 This effect clearly pops up, when leaving the mutual Fandène outside and the remaining mutuals get a 
significant negative coefficient.   12
Table 4: Probability of hospitalization and determinants of expenditure in case of  
 hospitalization  
















Individual and household 
characteristics 
      








Age group 1 (age < 26) 
 



























Membership ( in health insurance 

















Type of illness (complications 
during pregnancy/childbirth, 1=yes) 




Severity of illness (number of days 
hospitalized) 
     0,015*** 
(0,005) 
Wolof (household belonging to 

















Income (expenditures per 






Income terzile: Lower  
 









Community characteristics        
Fandène (household belonging to 









Sanghé (1= household belonging to 









Mont Rolland (household 
belonging to Mont Rolland 









Number of observations  2855  2855  118  118 
Chi²/ F value  103,00  103,96  3,990  4,176 
Corrected r squared      0,264  0,289 
Prob > Chi²/ F value  0,000  0,000  0,000  0,000 
Frequencies of actual / predicted 
outcomes 
94,7 %  94,7 %     
* Significant at 0,1 level  ** Significant at 0,05 level  ***significant at 0,01 level 
Source: own estimation based on ZEF-ISED survey data   13
To sum up, it can be said that members are (can be) hospitalized more often and pay 
considerable less for treatment than non-members. Other important factors are "age", "type of 
illness", "gender", "income", and "village effects".  
The case study on the community-based health insurance schemes in Senegal shows that the 
formation of a health insurance scheme for households in rural areas is possible and can result 
in a better access to health care for otherwise excluded people. Especially in places where 
local institutions have already developed forms of mutual help, there seem to exist 
possibilities to develop them to more formalized approaches. From the Senegalese case study 
it turns out that beside an existing local network, the existence of viable health care provider 
is of tremendous importance. Without the financial support of the hospital as well as the well 
perceived quality provided – the hospital is well know for it’s good quality in service 
provision - , it is difficult to imagine that the mutals would still exists. Hence, subsidies seem 
to be necessary if one wants to set up an insurance scheme for poor people. 
Finally, also individual and household characteristics play a role for the viability of rural 
health insurance schemes. In areas with widespread poverty and a scattered population setting 
up a health insurance scheme is much more difficult than in more richer and populated areas. 
As the analysis of the determinants of participation in micro-insurance schemes has revealed 
against the expectations of most donors and policy makers they do not necessarily reach all 
population groups in a village. In fact, for the lowest income group the premium to insure the 
whole family reaches nearly 8 % of the annual income of the household
6. Support for this 
group should therefore be secured by the state. This could be done for example in the form of 
subsidized premiums.  
5 Outlook 
The results of the experience with mutual health organization in Senegal suggests, that rural 
health insurance for the poor is under certain conditions feasible. More importantly, it could 
be shown that access to health insurance can have a positive impact on the economic and 
social situation of their members.  To what extent health insurance, or rather the lack thereof 
affects people’s labor productivity and willingness to undertake risky, but potentially 
profitable investments needs to be further investigated.  
To enlarge the access to health care of the poor and the rural population, community based 
health insurance schemes can be an important element and a first step. It allows to a limited 
degree to pool risks and thereby leads to an improvement in the health care system, where 
most people otherwise have to pay their health expenditure out-of-pocket. However, the study 
also points to the persisting problem of social exclusion, i.e. that the poorest of the community 
have no opportunity to participate and they have not enough resources to pay the required 
premium. In order to overcome these limitations of community based health insurance, 
broader risk pools are required. In particular, the role of external financial support such as 
government subsidies, donor funding, re-insurance in encouraging social inclusion needs to 
be further explored. Further research is needed, how these schemes can be scaled up and 
replicated as well as how to link them to other social risk management instruments like social 
funds. 
                                                 
6 An individual household has to weight these costs against the probability to be hospitalized and the average 
cost for treatment. The direct average financial costs for one hospitalization of a household member lies already 
above 20 % of the annual income of the household.  
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